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Abstract
In mechanism design theory, a designer would like to implement a desired social
choice function which species her favorite outcome for each possible prole of all
agents' types. Since the designer does not know each agent's private type, what she
can do is to construct a mechanism and choose an outcome after observing a prole
of agents' strategies. There is a dilemma in the sense that even if the designer is not
satised with some outcome, she has to obey the mechanism designed by herself and
announce this outcome. In this paper, we generalize the mechanism design theory
to a case where the designer can take some action to actively adjust agents' private
types, and yield a more favorite outcome. After dening a series of notions such as
adjustable types, optimal adjustment cost and protably Bayesian implementability,
we propose that the traditional notion of Bayesian incentive compatibility does
not hold in this generalized case. Finally, we construct a model to illustrate that
the auctioneer can obtain an expected prot greater than what she obtains in the
traditional optimal auction.
Key words: Mechanism design; Optimal auction; Bayesian Nash implementation.
1 Introduction
In the framework of mechanism design theory [1{4], there are one designer and
some agents. 1 The designer would like to implement a desired social choice
function which species her favorite outcome for each possible prole of agents'
types. However, agents' types are modelled as their private properties and
unknown to the designer. The designer only knows the distribution of agents'
 Corresponding author.
Email address: 18621753457@163.com (Haoyang Wu).
1 The designer is denoted as \She", and the agent is denoted as \He".
types. In order to implement the social choice function, the designer constructs
a mechanism which species each agent's strategy set (i:e:, the allowed actions
of each agent) and an outcome function (i:e:, a rule for how agents' actions get
turned into a social choice). During the process of an mechanism, the designer
may be in a dilemma in the sense that even if some prole of agents' strategies
leads to an outcome with low revenue, she has to announce it because she must
obey the mechanism designed by herself.
The designer may improve her situation by holding a charity auction. Engers
and McManus [5] proposed that agents' bids in a rst-price charity auction
are greater than those in a standard (non-charity) auction because of the
charitable benet that winners receive from their own payments. Besides the
charity auction, there may exist another way for the designer to increase her
revenue.
For example, let the designer be an auctioneer who sells a good, and each agent
be a bidder whose initial valuation to the good (i:e:, private type) is low. In
order to obtain as much prot as possible, suppose the designer is able to take
some costly action (e:g:, advertisement) to adjust each agent's valuation to the
good. Without loss of generality, we assume that each agent's valuation and
bid both increase concavely with the growth of the cost spent by the designer,
and the designer's utility is a linear function of the winner agent's bid. From
the viewpoint of the designer, as long as her marginal utility is greater than
her marginal cost, it is worthwhile for her to continue investing on this costly
adjustment. Obviously, the designer will obtain the maximum prot when her
marginal utility is equal to her marginal cost. Thus, if the designer can adjust
agents' types, she may actively escape from the above-mentioned dilemma and
yield an outcome better than what would happened without doing so.
In this paper, we generalize the mechanism design theory to a case where the
designer can take some action to adjust agents' types. In Section 2, we give a
series of notions and propositions. In Section 3, we construct a model to show
that by adjusting agents' types, the designer can obtain an expected prot
greater than what she can obtain in the traditional optimal auction model.
2 Theoretical analysis
Following Section 23.B of MWG's textbook [1], we consider a setting with
one designer and I agents, indexed by i = 1;    ; I. These agents make a
collective choice from a set X of possible alternatives. We make the following
two assumptions:
Assumption 1: Prior to the choice, each agent i is assumed to observe a pri-
2
vate parameter (i:e:, type i) which determines his preference over alternatives
in X. Let i be the set of agent i's all possible types, and 
0
i 2 i be agent
i's initial type.
Assumption 2: The designer constructs a mechanism and announces an out-
come after observing a prole of agents' strategies. She is assumed to be able
to take some action to adjust all agents' private types before the mechanism
works. This action is characterized by the relevant cost spent by the designer.
Denition 1: Given each agent i's initial type 0i 2 i, suppose the designer
spends non-negative cost c 2 R+ to adjust agents' types. 2 Each agent i's
preference over the alternatives in X is determined by his adjustable type
ci 2 i. Let  = 1      I ,  = (1;    ; I) 2 . For each i = 1;    ; I,
let
0 = (01;    ; 0I ) 2 ;
0 i = (
0
1;    ; 0i 1; 0i+1;    ; 0I );
c = (c1;    ; cI) 2 ;
c i = (
c
1;    ; ci 1; ci+1;    ; cI):
A type adjustment function is denoted as (; c) :   R+ ! , in which
(; 0) =  for any  2 , i:e: zero cost means no type adjustment. Let c =
(0; c), 0(0) = (01(
0
1);    ; 0I(0I )) be the probability density function of
initial type prole 0 2 , and c(c) = (c1(c1);    ; cI(cI)) be the probability
density function of adjustable type prole c 2 . For each i = 1;    ; I, let
0 i(
0
 i) = (
0
1(
0
1);    ; 0i 1(0i 1); 0i+1(0i+1);    ; 0I(0I ));
c i(
c
 i) = (
c
1(
c
1);    ; ci 1(ci 1); ci+1(ci+1);    ; cI(cI)):
Assumption 3: The designer is assumed to know 0(0) and type adjustment
function (; c) for any c  0.
Denition 2: For any x 2 X, each agent i's utility is denoted as ui(x; i) 2 R,
where i 2 i. The designer's utility is denoted as ud(x) 2 R.
Denition 23.B.1 [1]: A social choice function (SCF) is a function f : ! X
that, for each possible prole of the agents' types  2 , assigns a collective
choice f() 2 X.
Denition 3: Given an SCF f and 0(0), for any c  0, the designer's
expected utility is denoted as ud(c) = Ecud(f(
c)), and her initial expected
utility is denoted as ud(0) = E0ud(f(
0)) for the case of zero cost.
2 The adjustment is observable to all agents, and the relevant cost c is common
knowledge among all agents and the designer.
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Denition 4: Given an SCF f and 0(0), for any c  0, the designer's
expected prot is denoted as pd(c) = ud(c)   c, and her initial expected prot
is denoted as pd(0) = ud(0) for the case of zero cost.
Assumption 4: ud(c) is assumed to be a concave function that satises the
following inequalities,
@ud(c)
@c
> 0;
@2ud(c)
@c2
< 0; for any c  0: 3
Proposition 1: If there exists c  0 such that
@ud(c)
@c

c=c
= 1; i:e:
@pd(c)
@c

c=c
= 0;
then the designer will obtain the maximum expected prot pd(c
) at c = c.
c is denoted as the optimal adjustment cost. By assumption 4, there holds
@ud(c)
@c

c=0
 1; i:e: @pd(c)
@c

c=0
 0:
Proposition 2: If the designer's expected utility ud(c) and expected prot
pd(c) satisfy the following condition,
@ud(c)
@c

c=0
< 1; i:e:
@pd(c)
@c

c=0
< 0; (1)
then the designer will obtain the maximum expected prot at c = 0.
Denition 23.B.3 [1]: A mechanism   is a collection of I strategy sets
S1;    ; SI , and an outcome function g, i:e:,   = (S1;    ; SI , g()). A strategy
of each agent i in   is a function si() : i ! Si. Let s() = (s1();    ; sI()).
The outcome function is dened by g(s()) : ! X.
Assumption 5: Assume that in a mechanism  , each agent i can play his
strategy si() without any cost. Hence agent i's utility ui(x; i) is just his prot
obtained from the outcome x. 4
Denition 23.D.1 [1]: The strategy prole s() = (s1();    ; sI()) is a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) if, for all agent
3 See the example given in Section 3, when each agent i's adjustable type is a square
root function with the designer's cost as specied by Eq(5) and the social choice
function is specied by Eq(6), then the inequalities in Formula (1) holds.
4 For example, suppose that each agent is a bidder in an auction, then each agent
can be considered to submit his bid to the auctioneer without any cost.
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i and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)ji]  E i [ui(g(s^i; s i( i)); i)ji]; (2)
for all s^i 2 Si.
Denition 23.D.2 [1]: The mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) implements the
social choice function f() in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if there is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of  , s() = (s1();    ; sI()), such that g(s()) = f() for
all  2 .
Denition 5: Given an SCF f and 0(0), f is protably Bayesian imple-
mentable if the following conditions are satised:
1) The optimal adjustment cost c > 0, which means that the distribution of
agents' private types are adjusted to c

(c

).
2) There are a mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) and a strategy prole s() =
(s1();    ; sI()) such that:
(i) For all agent i, and all c

i 2 i,
Ec i [ui(g(s

i (
c
i ); s

 i(
c
 i)); 
c
i )jc

i ]  Ec i [ui(g(s^i; s

 i(
c
 i)); 
c
i )jc

i ] (3)
for all s^i 2 Si. 5
(ii) g(s()) = f() for all  2 .
Proposition 3: Given an SCF f and 0(0), if f is protably Bayesian imple-
mentable, then the designer's expected prot at the optimal adjustment cost
is greater than her initial expected prot.
Proof : Given that f is protably Bayesian implementable, then the optimal
adjustment cost c > 0. By Proposition 1, pd(c) > pd(0). 2
Denition 23.B.5 [1]: A direct mechanism is a mechanism  0 = (S 01;    ; S 0I ,
g0()) in which S 0i = i for all i and g0() = f() for all  2 .
Denition 23.D.3 [1]: The social choice function f() is truthfully imple-
mentable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium (or Bayesian incentive compatible) if
s0i (i) = i for all i 2 i (i = 1;    ; I) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the
direct mechanism  0 = (S 01;    ; S 0I ; g0()), in which S 0i = i, g0 = f . That is,
if for all i = 1;    ; I and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(f(i;  i); i)ji]  E i [ui(f(^i;  i); i)ji]; (4)
5 Note that after the designer spends the optimal adjustment cost c, each agent
i's private type is adjusted from his initial type 0i to 
c
i . In Formula (3), the
probability density function of type prole c

 i = (
c
1 ;    ; c

i 1; 
c
i+1;    ; c

I ) is
c

 i(
c
 i). As a comparison, in the traditional notion of Bayesian Nash equilibrium,
there is no type adjustment. Thus, the probability density function of type prole
 i = (1;    ; i 1; i+1;    ; I) in Formula (4) is just 0 i(0 i).
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for all ^i 2 i.
Proposition 4: Given an SCF f and 0(0), if f is protably Bayesian im-
plementable, then the traditional notion of Bayesian incentive compatibility
does not hold in this generalized case.
Proof : Given that f is protably Bayesian implementable, then the optimal
adjustment cost c > 0. Note that formula (3) is based on the distribution
c

 i(
c
 i) (see Footnote 5), and the designer's expected prot is pd(c
).
As a comparison, in the notion of Bayesian incentive compatibility (see Def-
inition 23.D.3), there is a direct mechanism  0 = (S 01;    ; S 0I ; g0()), in which
S 0i = i, g
0 = f , and the strategy prole s0() =  for all  2  is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of  0. By the denition of direct mechanism (see Denition
23.B.5), the designer does not take any type adjustment action during the
process of mechanism. Thus, formula (4) is based on the distribution 0 i(
0
 i)
(see Footnote 5), and the designer's expected prot is just pd(0).
Note that formula (4) cannot be inferred from formula (3) because the distri-
bution 0 i(
0
 i) is distinct from the distribution 
c
 i(
c
 i). Thus, the traditional
notion of Bayesian incentive compatibility does not hold in this generalized
case. 2
3 Example
Following the auction model in MWG's book (Page 863, [1]), we suppose there
are one designer and two agents. The designer is an auctioneer who wants to
sell a good, and each agent i's initial valuation to the good is i  0, i:e:,
i = R
+. We consider a rst-price-sealed-bid auction setting: Each agent i
is allowed to submit a sealed bid bi  0. The bids are then opened, and the
agent with the higher bid gets the good, and must pay money equal to his bid
to the auctioneer.
Suppose each agent i's initial valuation 0i is drawn independently from the
uniform distribution on [0; 1]. The distribution is known by the designer but
the exact value of each 0i is agent i's private information. In order to obtain
as much prot as possible, the designer spends some advertisement cost c  0
to increase each agent i's valuation to the good. Let  > 0 be a coecient,
suppose each agent i's valuation (i:e:, his adjustable type) is a square root
function of the cost c,
ci = (1 + 
p
c)0i : (5)
Thus,
@ci
@c
=
0i
2
p
c
;
@2ci
@c2
=  
0
i
4
c 3=2:
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That is, for any c  0, the following formulas hold:
@ci
@c

c=0
= +1; @
c
i
@c
> 0;
@2ci
@c2
< 0:
Let  = (1; 2), consider the social choice function
f() = (y1(); y2(); yd(); u1(); u2(); ud()); (6)
in which
y1() = 1; if 1  2; = 0 if 1 < 2
y2() = 1; if 1 < 2; = 0 if 1  2
yd() = 0; for all  2 
u1() =  1y1()=2
u2() =  2y2()=2
ud() = [1y1() + 2y2()]=2:
The subscript d stands for the designer, and the subscript 1; 2 stands for the
agent 1 and agent 2 respectively. yi = 1 means that agent i gets the good.
Now we will investigate whether this social choice function is Bayesian im-
plementable. We will look for an equilibrium in which each agent i's strategy
bi() takes the form bi(ci ) = ici = i(1 + 
p
c)0i for i 2 [0; 1].
Suppose that agent 2's strategy has this form, and consider agent 1's problem.
For each possible c1, agent 1 wants to solve the following problem:
max
b10
(c1   b1)Prob(b2(c2)  b1):
Because agent 2's highest possible bid is 2(1 + 
p
c) when 02 = 1, it is
evident that agent 1's bid b1 should never more than 2(1 + 
p
c). Since 02 is
uniformly distributed on [0; 1], and b2(
c
2) = 2(1 + 
p
c)02  b1 if and only if
02  b1=[2(1 + 
p
c)], hence we can write agent 1's problem as:
max
0b12(1+pc)
(c1   b1)b1
2(1 + 
p
c)
The solution to this problem is
b1(
c
1) =
8<:c1=2; if 01=2  22(1 + pc); if 01=2 > 2 :
Similarly,
b2(
c
2) =
8<:c2=2; if 02=2  11(1 + pc); if 02=2 > 1 :
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Letting 1 = 2 = 1=2, we see that the strategies b

i (
c
i ) = 
c
i=2 for i = 1; 2
constitute a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for this mechanism. Thus, there is a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this mechanism that indirectly yields the out-
comes specied by the social choice function f(), and hence f() is Bayesian
Nash implementable.
Let us consider the designer's expected prot:
pd(c) = (1 + 
p
c)E[01y1(
c) + 02y2(
c)]=2  c:
The designer's problem is to choose an optimal cost c  0 to maximize her
expected prot, i:e:,
max
c0
(1 + 
p
c)E[01y1(
c) + 02y2(
c)]=2  c
According to Appendix A, the designer's initial expected prot is pd(0) =
E[01y1(
c) + 02y2(
c)]=2 = 1=3. Thus, the designer's problem is reformulated
as:
max
c0
(1 + 
p
c)=3  c
It can be easily derived that the optimal cost c = 2=36. By Denition 5,
f() is protably Bayesian implementable. The maximum expected prot of
the designer is:
pd(c
) = (1 + 
p
c)=3  c = 1
3
(1 +
2
12
):
Obviously, when  >
p
3, there exists pd(c
) > 5=12. Note that the designer's
maximum expected prot in the optimal auction with two bidders is 5=12
(see Page 23, the ninth line from the bottom, Ref [6]). Therefore, by adjust-
ing agents' types, the seller can obtain an expected prot greater than the
maximum expected prot given by the traditional optimal auction.
The prot of the winner agent i is:
ui(f(
c); c

i ) = 
c
i   bi (c

i ) = 
0
i (1 + 
p
c)=2 =
0i
2
(1 +
2
6
) >
0i
2
:
It can be seen that the winner's prot is also increased when agents' types are
adjustable.
4 Conclusions
Traditionally, agents' types are considered as private and endogenous values,
which means that the designer has no way to know and adjust each agent's
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type. Thus, although the designer constructs a mechanism in order to im-
plement her favorite social choice function, she behaves just like a passive
observer after receiving a prole of agents' strategies: i:e:, she must obey the
mechanism and announce the outcome specied by the outcome function, no
matter whether she is satised with the outcome or not.
This paper generalizes the traditional mechanism design theory to a case where
agents' types can be adjusted by the designer. In the generalized case, by
adjusting agents' types the designer behaves just like an active modulator who
can choose an optimal adjustment cost and maximize her expected prot.
In Section 2, we dene a series of notions such as adjustable types, optimal
adjustment cost, protably Bayesian implementability and so on. Then we
propose that the traditional notion of Bayesian incentive compatibility does
not hold in this generalized case. In Section 3, we construct a model to show
that by adjusting agents' types, the designer can obtain an expected prot
greater than the maximum expected prot yielded by the traditional optimal
auction. At the same time, the winner agent's prot is also increased.
Appendix
As specied in Section 3, 01 and 
0
2 are drawn independently from the uniform
distribution on [0; 1]. Let Z be a random variable dened as Z = 01y1(
c) +
02y2(
c).
f01(z) =
8>><>>:
0; z < 0
1; z 2 [0; 1]
0; z > 1
:
F01(z) = Probf01  zg =
8>><>>:
0; z < 0
z; z 2 [0; 1]
1; z > 1
:
FZ(z) = [F01(z)]
2 =
8>><>>:
0; z < 0
z2; z 2 [0; 1]
1; z > 1
:
Therefore,
fZ(z) =
8>><>>:
0; z < 0
2z; z 2 [0; 1]
0; z > 1
:
As a result,
E(Z) =
Z 1
0
z  2zdz =
Z 1
0
2z2dz = 2=3:
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Therefore, E[01y1(
c)+ 02y2(
c)]=2 = 1=3. According to Eq (6), the designer's
initial expected prot and utility are pd(0) = ud(0) = 1=3.
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